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Social Reform, State Reform, and Aristide Briand’s
Moment of Hope in France, 1909–1910
Julian Wright
The period of Aristide Briand’s ﬁrst ministry, from the summer of 1909
to the autumn of 1910, oﬀers a very particular window on the politics
and intellectual arguments of the Third Republic. Falling between a
period of comparative stability, when the Radical governments of Emile
Combes (1902–5) and Georges Clemenceau (1906–9) had dominated
politics, and a period of greater confusion, from 1910 to 1914, Briand’s
ﬁrst ministry coincided with a great resurgence of optimism in French
politics. Combes and Clemenceau had fought battles that, according
to republican orthodoxy, were necessary to establish the republic on
a ﬁrmer footing. Yet these battles had been divisive. A constructive
reform agenda, led by the soft-tongued center-left politician Briand,
oﬀered a new tone and a new hope. The diversity of the forces that
coalesced in support of Briand gives his ‘‘moment of hope’’ great sig-
niﬁcance for understanding the nature of republican political debate
in the Third Republic as a whole.
One important reason to focus on Briand’s ﬁrst government is that
the complexity of the period from 1909 to the First World War is often
oversimpliﬁed in textbooks, where, understandably, the space for these
years is devoted largely to foreign aﬀairs. There is more at stake here,
however. During Briand’s ﬁrst ministry several strands of French politi-
cal thought came together that have received too little attention. Ques-
tions such as how to decentralize the state and reform the electoral sys-
tem fascinated republicans at the time; and yet much historiography
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sidelines those very questions. From the Boulanger crisis and the Drey-
fus aﬀair through the political crisis of the mid-1920s and the Popu-
lar Front, the history of the Third Republic is often written as one of
moments of divisions between the two great movements in French poli-
tics, reaction and revolution.1 It is this dialectic that sets the agenda,
and issues that do not ﬁt its conceptualization of French politics are
often neglected. Briand’s ‘‘moment of hope,’’ then, demonstrates the
complexity of French politics.The intellectual movements and political
debates that are our subject here do not easily ﬁt into the classic nar-
rative of French political history. Thus our analysis of Briand’s moment
of hope has to be situated within a revisiting of the history of the Third
Republic as a whole.
Three vital themes came together during Briand’s ﬁrst govern-
ment: state reform, social reform, and, underscoring both, what we
may call an ‘‘impulse’’ for reconciliation. These have a relevance that
goes beyond the bounds of the Third Republic to the whole idea of
the state and social reform in contemporary France. In the wider per-
spective, the most interesting legacies have been left by constructive
reformers such as the social reformers of the Third Republic, the state
planners of the 1950s, or the advocates of decentralization since the
1980s. A commentator of 1910 described decentralization as a theme
that had been pored over for decades but that always seemed new and
startling. How pertinent that remark is in the twenty-ﬁrst century.2 Jean-
Pierre Raﬀarin framed his whole governmental enterprise within a mis-
sion to decentralize and rejuvenate the republic; but this present-day
state reformer has roots in a belle époque that French history has only
recently begun to examine.3 Thus the movement for state reform in
1910 foreshadowed a debate still unresolved today.
If state reform was one of the main themes of Briand’s ﬁrst minis-
try, social reformwas its essential complement.The social reformmove-
ment dwelt on several issues, but at its heart was the attempt to improve
labor relations. Judith F. Stone, who has been at the forefront of work
on this movement, has shown how such ideas penetrated the Radical
1 The classic characterization was that of the party of movement and the party of order:
François Goguel, La politique des partis sous la IIIe République, 4th ed. (Paris, 1958).
2 Henry Bérenger, in L’action, May 16, 1910: ‘‘Who would have thought that the idea of
reorganizing France’s administration on regional lines would have seemed a novelty, or a chimera?
If ever a question has been studied, discussed, elucidated over the last eighty years, it is that one.
Well! Ask ten Frenchmen at random: you won’t ﬁnd three who know the ﬁrst thing about it. This
will not stop them from shrugging their shoulders if someone, grounding their argument in tra-
dition and reason, suggests that they can accomplish regional reform.’’
3 Much of the rationale behind Raﬀarin’s program may be found in his book Pour une nou-
velle gouvernance (Paris, 2002).
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Party.4 But social reform was essential to a wider group of republicans.
Because theRadicals were often obsessed with the defense of the repub-
lic, there was a debate within Radicalism about whether social reform
was a distraction or a vital agenda that would rejuvenate the republic.
A third theme underpins these two reform movements, that of
apaisement (appeasement). This term was not merely a slogan—and it
was coined in domestic political debate, not in the context of inter-
war internationalism.5 I would argue that the word contained a seri-
ous reﬂection on the nature of political reform. Those who embraced
state reform and social reform described their politics as a ‘‘construc-
tive’’ politics, or a ‘‘politique réaliste’’ (i.e., a ‘‘politics of the real’’ or
‘‘politics of the possible,’’ rather than a ‘‘cynically realist politics’’). In
1910 this constructive politics was predicated on reconciliation. Indeed,
Briand’s most important contribution may have been not so much a
precise reform agenda as the expression of this feeling of reconcilia-
tion and generosity.6 Yet French republicanism has never been entirely
happy about reconciling itself with its opponents. One commentator
said that the Third Republic had failed because it could never achieve
true political consensus.7 The idea of apaisement has been described,
both at the time and subsequently, as a nefarious attempt to build a
coalition of Socialists and reactionaries against the dominant Radical
Party, which, with its concentration on the issues of universal suﬀrage
and the lay state, is the most apt representative of republicanism. It is
time to revisit this overly cynical position. Since François Furet’s seminal
Penser la Révolution française, the question of the end of the Revolution
has been reopened.8 With this in mind, the concept of reconciliation
may be seen as an attempt to halt the cycle of revolution and install a
regime of real progress and reform.Whether all republicans were ready
for this in 1910 is of course another matter, but for the reformers who
came together around Briand, the rejuvenation of the republic had to
begin with reconciliation.
These three themes, then, state reform, social reform, and the
impulse for reconciliation, deﬁne our understanding of Briand’s ﬁrst
ministry. To examine these topics, we will focus ﬁrst on the intellectual
4 Judith F. Stone, The Search for Social Peace: Reform Legislation in France, 1890–1914 (New
York, 1985).
5 One commentator to present Briand’s campaign for apaisement in a positive light was
Georges Bonnamour, L’apaisement: Les services français d’un homme d’état (Paris, 1913).
6 In Oct. 1910, one of Briand’s correspondents described his conception of the republic as
‘‘generous, expansive, fraternal.’’ Ministère des aﬀaires étrangères, PA-AP 335 (papiers Briand),
vol. 25 (hereafter ‘‘Briand papers,’’ followed by volume number).
7 Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres, 3 vols. (Paris, 1945).
8 François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. E. Forster (Cambridge, 1981).
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discussions that preceded Briand’s appointment as président du conseil
(president of the council, or prime minister).These can be traced back
to the late 1890s, through the young writers and politicians who led
the debate. In 1910 Briand brought social and state reform together,
giving them the umbrella heading rajeunissement (rejuvenation), yet not
all of the young intellectuals who had prepared the way for Briand
would have agreed that the two ideas could be so connected. Some con-
centrated on social reform and others on state reform—and, as will
become clear toward the end of our discussion, this dichotomy per-
sisted through 1910 and helps explain the ultimate failure of Briand’s
enterprise. One character is particularly important to the preliminary
study of intellectual precursors. Henry Bérenger is interesting not only
because he combined the two strands in his journalism but because
he had until 1906 been a most virulent advocate of the movement for
republican defense that attacked the church. No appeaser, he reveled
in the battle between right and left, and yet, during Briand’s ﬁrst min-
istry he was known as the intellectual mouthpiece of the government,
insisting that republicans embrace reform.His commentary onBriand’s
ﬁrst ministry is an important source for our study of the politics of
1910, not least because it demonstrates how Radicalism itself divided
on whether to support Briand.
Having presented this intellectual movement and its diﬀerent
strands, we will reintroduce the character of Aristide Briand. Although
he encapsulated the hope of both state reformers and social reform-
ers, he was no theorist and did not really belong to the intellectual
movements that placed such hope in him. His untheoretical approach
was important to reformers, however. They thought that one of the
republic’s problems was that it was obsessed with ideology and less
concerned with concrete results. This develops the concept we have
already outlined as a ‘‘politique réaliste.’’ The ‘‘realism’’ of Briand and
his intellectual precursors is an undercurrent in our analysis here. As
much as the actual reforms he proposed, Briand’s emphasis on concrete
and constructive measures is what won the young intellectuals over.
There is, however, an irony here that will become increasingly evident
in our analysis. Briand was himself unable to grasp the political ‘‘real-
ism’’ needed to make his agenda work in 1910.Ultimately, he could not
overcome the ‘‘real’’ problem of establishing a majority in the Chamber
that would unequivocally support his agenda. To understand why, we
will have to examine the ﬁne details of political argument in 1909, when
Briand’s program was announced in major speeches, through the elec-
tion of May 1910, to the autumn of that year, when a railway workers’
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strike gravely weakened his position. The ‘‘realist’’ agenda was in the
end compromised by the ‘‘realism’’ needed to hold his government and
his majority together.
Nevertheless, this moment of hope highlights several important
points. First, the intellectual debate was never as polarized around clas-
sic right or left ideological positions as some historiography would have
us believe. Second, the reform agenda as it was formulated in intel-
lectual circles did have an impact on politics, even if in 1910 it could
not fulﬁll its agenda through politics. We should not dismiss the move-
ment behind Briand just because Briand himself was unable to achieve
his goals. Many characters were inﬂuential in formulating opinion in
the interwar period, and from there, as Nicolas Roussellier has pointed
out, connections exist to reform agendas later in the century.9 Third,
the optimism that Briand inspired should not be cynically dismissed.
The reaction to Briand is important in itself and tells us about the way
politics and political ideas were received among the wider newspaper-
reading public. Pessimism has often dominatedmodern French history,
especially that of the 1930s. So perhaps the time is now ripe for a con-
sideration of one moment of hope.
The belle époque ‘‘reform constituency,’’ as Stone has described it, was
a middle-class movement for stabilizing class relations in the face of
revolution.10 Her presentation of the movement for solidarité (solidar-
ity, between classes) is convincing, particularly in light of some recent
approaches that have distorted our understanding of these political
reformers by equating their social reform with counterrevolution.11
Nevertheless, even Stone’s analysis has some problems. Social peace was
a goal; but this was only one part of a broader reconceptualization of
the republican state. Some of the young intellectuals who argued over
Briand’s program in 1909–10 saw social reform as themost essential ele-
ment; others argued for state reforms such as administrative decentral-
ization or electoral reform. But both were more interested in adapting
the state to modern problems than in self-interested class politics, how-
ever enlightened. Between social reform plans and state reform plans,
therefore, there was a community of interests, the ‘‘reform constitu-
ency,’’ that promoted the reconciliation of class, religious, and politi-
9 Nicolas Roussellier, ‘‘La contestation du modèle républicain dans les années trente: La
réforme de l’Etat,’’ in Le modèle républicain, ed. Serge Berstein and Odile Rudelle (Paris, 1992).
10 Stone, Search for Social Peace, x–xi.
11 E.g., Sanford Elwitt, The Third Republic Defended: Bourgeois Reform in France, 1880–1914
(Baton Rouge, LA, 1986).
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cal diﬀerences. In this section we examine the reform movement as
it coalesced around 1900, during the premiership of René Waldeck-
Rousseau. We then examine three aspects of the movement, stress-
ing that it beneﬁted from an internal coherence that one commen-
tator, Bérenger, articulated with particular skill. If we are to test the
coherence of Briand’s governmental program, it is vital to understand
the intellectual movement that prepared the way for his campaign of
apaisement.
Waldeck-Rousseau, erstwhile disciple of Léon Gambetta and a
highly respected ﬁgure in legal circles, reluctantly took the position of
président du conseil in 1899 as the Dreyfus aﬀair unraveled.12 Waldeck-
Rousseau is one of those ﬁgures who are often crowded out of our
understanding of this period: characters such as Jean Jaurès, Georges
Clemenceau, and Maurice Barrès seem more colorful and thus more
important. Yet for our understanding of the ‘‘reform constituency’’
and the ongoing projects they promoted,Waldeck-Rousseau is crucial.
It was not his ideological parentage in the opportunist party of the
1880s so much as his own intellectual disciples around 1900 that pro-
vide the key to understanding what his government was about. Around
him gathered an intriguing collection of young intellectuals who called
themselves the ‘‘Génération.’’13 It is true that, from this group, a con-
nection to the idea of middle-class defense certainly existed: Maurice
Colrat went on to found the Association de la Défense des Classes
Moyennes (Association for the Defense of the Middle Classes) in 1909.
Waldeck-Rousseau, however, had a much wider agenda. He and the
most important of his lieutenants, the Socialist Joseph Paul-Boncour,
wanted to move on from the period when political questions had been
tackled using abstract principles and replace these with pragmatic or
realist solutions. Thus the reformers were connected by their methods
to the opportunist politicians of the 1880s, especially Gambetta and
Jules Ferry; through them, their roots may be traced to the new sci-
ence of sociology, and to the thought of Auguste Comte in particular.
This school of thought stressed that the manner of reform was if any-
thing more important than the solutions proposed. For example, the
rapid changes brought about by the Constituent Assembly of 1789–91
had been dangerous because they had proceeded from ﬁrst principles.
However much one approved of the ideals of 1789, those could not in
themselves provide a detailed program that would reorganize the state
12 See, in particular, Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres, vol. 1, chap. 3.
13 Louis Guitard, La petite histoire de la IIIe République: Souvenirs de Maurice Colrat (Paris, 1959),
esp. chaps. 1–2; Christine Manigand, Henry de Jouvenel (Limoges, 2000).
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for the twentieth century. This concern was summed up by the reform-
ers with the term politique réaliste.
Paul-Boncour became the preeminent theorist of this movement
through the publication in 1900 of his thesis on economic federal-
ism. In it he argued that the republic must evolve by encouraging
the growth of professional associations. Organized where necessary on
regional lines, this associative life would regenerate the republic.14 This
work established his reputation, and the Socialist minister Alexandre
Millerand was among the eminent politicians who ensured, through a
subscription list, that it was published and widely read in high circles.15
In 1903 Paul-Boncour, an early member of the Fédération Régionaliste
Française (FrenchRegionalist Federation [FRF]), would open a remark-
able debate over the question of decentralization, in which his principal
opponent was the neomonarchist Charles Maurras.16 Thus, for Paul-
Boncour, social reform and state reform were connected: both were
part of what he called the ‘‘rejuvenation,’’ or ‘‘reorganization’’ of the
republic.Ultimately, he would see social changes as preeminent, and he
did not give Briand his unequivocal support in 1910. Like Briand, how-
ever, Paul-Boncour was guided by a concern for social and political rec-
onciliation—his 1909 entry into Parliament took place only when other
republican candidates had given way, allowing him a barely contested
election.17
The ‘‘Génération’’ represented a spectrum of reform. André Tar-
dieu, the frustrated reformer of the interwar years, worked alongside
Paul-Boncour in Waldeck-Rousseau’s oﬃces in the Interior Ministry.18
In the ﬁrst decade of the 1900s Tardieu was an eloquent advocate for
the moderate right-wing end of reformism. His article in Le temps in
response to Paul-Boncour’s decentralist manifesto of 1903 showed that
he was certainly not going to let a Socialist like his friend Paul-Boncour
claim all the decentralist kudos.19 Tardieu shared Paul-Boncour’s view
that a political réalisme was needed to allow for pragmatic reforms of the
state. He capitalized on the widespread use of the term réalisme in the
14 Joseph Paul-Boncour, Le fédéralisme économique: Etude sur les rapports de l’individu et des
groupements professionnels (Paris, 1900).
15 Correspondence in Archives Nationales (AN), 424 AP (papiers Paul-Boncour), 1
(doctorat).
16 The opening salvo appeared in La renaissance latine, July 15, 1903.This article and a num-
ber of responses to it, including those of Tardieu, Clemenceau, and Maurras himself appeared
as a collection: Joseph Paul-Boncour and Charles Maurras, Un débat nouveau sur la République et la
décentralisation (Toulouse, 1905). A new edition came out in 1923.
17 AN 424 AP, 1 (élection 1909).
18 The other members of the ‘‘Generation’’ included Maurice Colrat and Alfred de Monzie.
See Guitard, Petite histoire de la IIIe République, 26–27, 44.
19 Reprinted in Paul-Boncour and Maurras, Débat nouveau.
38 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES
1920s, as he developed his own agenda for reform, prior to becoming
prime minister in 1929.20
Another member of the ‘‘Génération’’ was Henri de Jouvenel, who,
like his younger brother Robert, became a leading advocate for elec-
toral reform. This advocacy, like Paul-Boncour’s and Tardieu’s, was in-
spired by a larger belief in the need for a rejuvenation of the repub-
lic. In what became a classic critique of the Third Republic, Robert de
Jouvenel expressed his generation’s frustration at Parliament’s failure
to deal with administrative and electoral reform, as well as the insti-
tution of an income tax and the need for more developed systems of
trade unions.21 Henri de Jouvenel connected the state reformers to high
society. More of a dilettante than Tardieu or Paul-Boncour, he never-
theless campaigned for reform and praised Paul-Boncour lavishly in a
pamphlet published when the latter became minister of labor in 1911.22
During Waldeck-Rousseau’s three years in government, the issue
that most inspired a reform-minded intellectual like Paul-Boncour was
the Law on Associations, passed in 1901.This law has a threefold impor-
tance for our analysis: ﬁrst, it shows the nature of the reforms on which
the ‘‘reform constituency’’ concentrated; second, it situates these re-
formers in a longer ideological lineage, underscoring the coherence
and depth of their ideas; and third, it demonstrates how the reformers
connected thoughts about social relationships to thoughts about the
nature of the state. Indeed, the underrating of reformers like Waldeck-
Rousseau and Briand stems largely from a failure to hold the ideas of
social reform and state reform alongside each other. The Law on Asso-
ciations was the work ofmen for whom these two ideas were interwoven.
This law forces us to accept that, by conceptualizing the two prob-
lems as one larger question about the need for a rejuvenated republic,
the reformers sought neither a middle-class counterrevolution nor an
authoritarian coup (which Tardieu came to support only in the 1930s).
ForWaldeck-Rousseau and Paul-Boncour in 1901, as for Briand in 1910,
the fundamental aim was to rejuvenate the republic by reorganizing it.
The Law onAssociations has sometimes been cast as the prelude to
the separation of church and state, which dominated the agenda after
Waldeck-Rousseau resigned in 1902. In reality, however, the law was
designed to adapt the state to new social imperatives by opening a chan-
nel between the state and the working class. Paul-Boncour described
20 François Monnet, Refaire la république: André Tardieu, une dérive réactionnaire (Paris, 1993),
esp. pt. 1.
21 Robert de Jouvenel, La république des camarades (Paris, 1914), 57.
22 M. Le Blond, Les idées de M. J. Paul-Boncour, preface by Henri de Jouvenel (Paris, 1911).
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it as an ‘‘organic law, which we were very wrong to transform, after
[Waldeck-Rousseau], into a combative law.’’23 The law allowed for the
development of associations within the indivisible republic. It called
into question the notion of the unitary state, which held that nothing
could come between the individual and the machinery of government.
Since it addressed the problem of class division, it was seen as begin-
ning a new vogue of republican reform. Not through the lay education
system alone would the republic implant itself in French society: the
proponents of this law believed that it needed to revive organs at an
intermediary level, allowing unions to play a beneﬁcial role in society.
Paul-Boncour had insisted in his thesis that this associationism was
nothing less than a reorganization of the economic and social life of
France on federal lines, where trades unions and regional assemblies
would emerge, establishing links among themselves at the regional level
and thus becoming powerful partners in the state.The Law on Associa-
tions therefore began the process of adapting the legal framework of
French jurisprudence to promote the reorganization and rejuvenation
of the republic.
We will see shortly how the personalities of 1901 reemerged in
1909–10, but we should also notice the ongoing importance of the
Law on Associations itself. Indeed, during the ﬁrst Briand govern-
ment, there was a feeling that the full beneﬁts of the 1901 law had
not yet been drawn. In October 1909 Alexandre Millerand (whom
Briand had appointed minister of commerce) ruefully recounted how
a visitor from the Canadian government had expressed surprise at
the persistently problematic legal and political status of trades unions
in France. Inspired by Waldeck-Rousseau, Canada had formulated its
own law on associations and seemed to be reaping far greater bene-
ﬁts than France.24 Thus when the young intellectuals around Waldeck-
Rousseau achieved positions of greater inﬂuence, the Law on Associa-
tions remained an essential reference point.
The intellectual web behind this reform constituency is appar-
ently sturdy, consisting in a reformist ‘‘middle way’’ between a desire to
refound the corporative society of the ancien régime and the unitar-
ism of Jacobin ideology. Certainly, an intellectual parentage can easily
be found for this movement in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville,
23 Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres, 1:120. See also 1:30–32. In 1901 Paul-Boncour wrote
an extended apologia for the law in the avant-garde journal Revue naturiste (ﬁrst three numbers
of 1901).
24 Speech given by Millerand to the electors of the twelfth arrondissement of Paris, on the
twentieth anniversary of his election to parliament: reported in L’action, Oct. 24, 1909.
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Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Auguste Comte, Frédéric Le Play, and, closer
to hand, Jules Ferry, Léon Bourgeois, and reformist Socialists such as
Alfred Fouillée.Yet the ideas promoted by the young intellectuals of the
new century did not impinge on political debates in a straightforward
way. Diﬀerent participants in the reform debate would take up diﬀer-
ent positions in diﬀerent parties. The other dominant issues of the day,
particularly the question of the church, divided the reformers, and it
would appear that the moments when reformers came together, 1900–
1901 and 1909–10, were rare.Yet only by putting these moments at cen-
ter stage can we assess the signiﬁcance of reform proponents such as
Briand. We must therefore pass over the period 1902–9 and examine
the reform constituency as it reemerged during a frustrating time for
republicans of all stripes.
This time came with the end of Clemenceau’s ﬁrst government
in 1909. Clemenceau, the great critic of the unreformed republic in
the late nineteenth century, had himself become a force preventing
change: as the premier ﬂic (top cop) of France, he repressed strikes and
scorned regionalists while failing to reform social relations or adminis-
trative structures. After his resignation, the twin themes of the reform
constituency, state reform and social reform, reemerged. Between 1902
and 1909, however, these themes had been developed outside the po-
litical arena. The important features of this development include the
regionalist movement and the campaign for electoral reform, two ele-
ments of the movement for state reform, and the ‘‘Comité de la démoc-
ratie sociale,’’ which campaigned for social reform. Thanks to these
groups, questions of state reform and social reform began to ﬁgure
prominently in political manifestos. Moreover, all three had connec-
tions to the debate that Briand incited in 1909–10. Having dealt with
the three movements in turn, we will examine the career of Bérenger,
who showed how state reform and social reform could be married.
From 1900 to 1909 the regionalist movement worked hard to pene-
trate political opinion25 but was hindered somewhat by its determi-
nation to remain nonpartisan. The names elected to the FRF’s hon-
orary committee reveal its eclecticism: they included Barrès, Charles
Longuet (the son-in-law of Karl Marx), the old Radical deputy Charles
Beauquier,26 the moderate Louis Marin, and the legitimist Breton dep-
uty the Marquis de l’Estourbeillon. In its early days the FRF was a some-
what unfocused organization. But its secretary-general, the journalist
25 See Wright, Regionalist Movement in France, chap. 5.
26 Charles Beauquier, Radical Socialist deputy of the Doubs, was chairman of the Cham-
ber’s Decentralization Commission under the Clemenceau government.
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and teacher Jean Charles-Brun, ensured that by 1910 the FRF had taken
a positive and pragmatic direction. The regionalists organized confer-
ences that had limited and precise objectives: to debate the economic
problems of the Loire Valley, for example, or to teach regional litera-
ture and history in schools. Thus regionalism had a twin face: emerg-
ing from provincial cultural and literary organizations and their avant-
gardes in Paris, it acquired a practical outlook that could aﬀect political
debates.27
When Radical Socialists asked, ‘‘Where next?’’ after the crisis over
the separation of church and state, a project of administrative decen-
tralisation, taking as a model the ‘‘living’’ regions, with their deﬁned
economic and cultural identities, was a worthy part of the program.28
But the FRF had not succeeded in convincing all politicians of the
Left that it was a truly republican enterprise. Charles-Brun suggested
in 1905 that the ﬁrst task of regionalism was to unite those regional-
ists who thought like Paul-Boncour and those who thought like Maur-
ras. For him, the question of regime was in fact less fundamental than
the question of what sort of republic or monarchy one envisaged:
unitary or decentralized.29 Thus Maurras was rarely attacked head-on
by the regionalists, and when Briand himself seemed to advocate re-
gional decentralization, the debate was confused by a constant stream
of articles in Action française arguing that republican regionalism was
a misnomer. This did not help the regionalists’ cause with Radicals
who advocated republican defense. Even so, regionalism had won over
enough converts by 1910 for theMaurras-induced confusion to be less a
problem than such practical questions as how the decentralization pro-
cess might work, what shape the regions would take, and how such a
reform might aﬀect institutions like the Senate.
In 1910 these questions were gathered under the heading ‘‘Ré-
forme administrative.’’ It was ‘‘Réforme électorale,’’ however, that drew
the most attention. Like regionalism, the ‘‘RPéiste’’ movement (RP
standing for représentation proportionnelle) led by Charles Benoist was
eclectic in its advocates and suﬀered from the technical diﬃculties of
constructing a detailed proposal for reform. The RPéistes argued that
electoral reform, based on a system of proportional representation,
was part of the program of republican rejuvenation.30 Their histori-
27 Jean Charles-Brun, Le régionalisme (Paris, 1911), 37.
28 Serge Berstein does not pursue the connection, made by the Radical Ferdinand Buisson,
between electoral reform and regional decentralization, twin pillars of state reform: see Berstein,
Histoire du Parti radical, 2 vols. (Paris, 1980), 1:58–67.
29 Edmond Lizop, ‘‘De la terre natale à l’humanité fédérale,’’ Politique 37 (1967): 144.
30 Throughout 1907 the Radical Party consulted its members on electoral reform, produc-
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cal reference point was Gambetta.31 In the 1880s the Chamber had
put aside proportional representation to follow a two-stage constitu-
ency election model. Yet Gambetta had clearly outlined the view that
the system most appropriate to a mature republic was one in which all
parties were equitably represented.32 Themovement drew support from
men who believed that the achievement of universal suﬀrage was not
enough in itself. Jean Jaurès and Ferdinand Buisson were among the
more notable ﬁgures who supported the campaign when a formal par-
liamentary group was formed in 1907.33 It was under Briand in 1909
that the Chamber ﬁrst debated proportional representation in detail.
If state reform attracted a variety of intellectuals, those who con-
centrated on social reform tended to have more clearly deﬁned politi-
cal positions. We turn now from the regionalists and RPéistes to a
group that best represents the social reform theme within the intellec-
tual movement. The Comité de la Démocratie Sociale was founded in
1906 as a ‘‘study group’’ bringing together Radicals, Radical Socialists,
and independent socialists who sought a new agenda for the repub-
lic. The challenge was to move on from the question of republican
defense to more constructive measures. Joseph Paul-Boncour, a found-
ing member, outlined the Comité’s program: nationalization of cer-
tain industries, a state insurance scheme, unions for state employ-
ees, and obligatory collective bargaining in industry.34 These reforms
were designed to bring the growing syndicalist movement closer to the
state. Paul-Boncour conceived them as furthering the work of Waldeck-
Rousseau’s government by developing possibilities opened up by the
Law on Associations.
The two most important members of the Comité were the Social-
ist journalist Léon Parsons and a young law lecturer, later an eminent
economist, Etienne Antonelli. Parsons had become known in the 1890s
as an advocate of reformist socialism. Around the turn of the century
he became an important ﬁgure in a reform socialist movement called
L’Oeuvre.35 Paul-Boncour had attended their meetings regularly, and
with his help Parsons brought together Radical Socialist reformers as
the 1902–6 legislature drew to a close. Parsons was the group’s publi-
ing a majority in favor of limited change, with some clearly against and others, led by Buisson,
strongly supportive of proportional representation. Berstein, Histoire du Parti radical, 1:58.
31 In De Gambetta à Briand (Paris, 1914), the commentator Georges Béret emphasized the
solidity of the historical connection.
32 Correspondence and notes of Gambetta were passed on to Briand as he studied the ques-
tion in 1909. See Briand papers, vol. 8.
33 E. Le Chartier, La France et son parlement (Paris, 1911), 1084.
34 Joseph Paul-Boncour, ‘‘Le comité de la démocratie sociale,’’ Le censeur, Oct. 6, 1906.
35 Le Blond, Idées de Paul-Boncour, 24–25.
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cist: it was he who suggested the founding of a weekly newspaper, La
démocratie sociale.
Antonelli had a greater aptitude for discussion of political econ-
omy. In 1911 he gave classes at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques
et Sociales on ‘‘Les actions de travail dans les sociétés anonymes à par-
ticipation ouvrière.’’36 His studies on political economy and socialist
philosophy gave La démocratie sociale a serious academic tone. In 1924
he was elected to Parliament from the Haute-Savoie.While his inclina-
tions were clearly on the left (throughout the period he wrote for Le
peuple, organ of the Confédération Générale duTravail), it was above all
Antonelli’s status as a distinguished economist that deﬁned his political
contribution: he reported the budget for social insurance from 1924
to 1931.
The loose and anonymous group of left-leaning politicians that
originally met at the Comité in 1906 included many disaﬀected Radi-
cals.Yet the struggle to make Radicals more aware of the need for social
reform did not take place in the 1906–10 legislature, for all the pressure
that Paul-Boncour, Antonelli, and Parsons had applied at the outset. It
was not easy to oppose the strikebreaking Clemenceau when their own
patrons, notably Briand himself, held cabinet seats. Only whenClemen-
ceau fell in 1909 did the group resurface. The bureau of the Comité
organized a general assembly at the Café Cardinal, their old meeting
place, for July 1909.37 La démocratie sociale appeared a few months later,
its ﬁrst number coinciding fortuitously with a major speech given by
Briand at Périgueux.38 With Briand at the head of government, the
Comité could now claim—as it never could in 1906—to be a discussion
group with a real chance of inﬂuencing policy. No longer, its members
hoped, would their plans emerge in projects buried in those ‘‘ossuaries
of the republic,’’ the commissions of the Chamber; now they could pro-
vide the intellectual cohesion behind a whole governmental program.
The ﬁrst issue of the newspaper reiterated the principles that un-
derlay all discussion of social or state reform. It was not proportional
representation or collective bargaining per se that mattered but the
process by which such measures were introduced. ‘‘We do not want to
create a new party,’’ wrote the editor; ‘‘rather, we want to bring new
36 A special issue of the Revue d’histoire économique et sociale in 1953 was devoted to Anto-
nelli. See esp. J. Morimi-Comby, ‘‘La carrière enseignante d’Etienne Antonelli,’’ and J. Milhau,
‘‘L’action politique d’Etienne Antonelli.’’ See also Antonelli, La démocratie sociale devant les idées pré-
sentes (Paris, 1911).
37 Etienne Antonelli, La démocratie sociale: Un programme d’avant-guerre, pour une politique
d’après-guerre (Paris, 1919), 21.
38 The ﬁrst number was published on Oct. 16, 1909, less than a week after Briand’s speech.
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life to the political activity of French democracy.’’39 It was the utility
of reforms rather than their following a particular political line that
deﬁned their interest, as the manifesto in this ﬁrst issue emphasized:
‘‘By thus preparing, without party bias, the materials needed by law-
makers of the future, we will be more useful than if we contented
ourselves with entering into the sterile struggle of political and eco-
nomic doctrines where, so far, the great republican parties have wasted
themselves.’’40
Two months later the Comité drew up a manifesto for the coming
general elections. It was published in their journal under the heading
‘‘La politique réaliste.’’41 There was more to this than merely a platform
designed to unite a left and center-left majority, in a tactical restruc-
turing of the Radicals and independent socialists. ‘‘Realism’’ deﬁned an
approach to politics that steered away from the rhetoric of classic Radi-
calism: ‘‘This state of mind is a fear and rejection of any a priori formula
imposing itself on governmental and legislative action. . . . the govern-
mentmust place itself face-to-face with present reality, and consider the
social body as a living organism.’’42
On the question of which reform, in this ‘‘realist’’ approach, was
the most pressing, the Comité emphasized social reform over reform
of the state. But the Comité was not the only part of the reform move-
ment that hoped to gain ground under Briand. Some of the force of the
Comité’s argument was lost when the press fell to debating in minute
detail the question of proportional representation. Paul-Boncour was
by early 1910 writing a weekly article in the Socialist journal La lanterne,
where strong opposition to electoral reform was often voiced. He had
to steer his articles away from the issue of state reform. Not all of his
readers would have seen the connection between his moderate social-
ism, on the one hand, and regionalism or the RPéiste campaign, on the
other. Meanwhile, Parsons and Antonelli turned to a speciﬁc question,
‘‘Les actions du travail dans les sociétés de participation ouvrière.’’43
They argued that social reformhad to proceed by forging links between
workers and employers, to the workers’ advantage. Participation meant
participation in the fruits of industry. On this question, one of their
principal authorities was Briand himself, who in 1906 had led a discus-
sion about it at the Comité.
The intellectual who brought together the twin themes of the re-
39 La démocratie sociale, Oct. 16, 1909.
40 Ibid.
41 La démocratie sociale, Dec. 11, 1909.
42 Ibid.
43 Etienne Antonelli, Les actions du travail (Paris, 1912).
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form movement was Bérenger. He was not, so far as we can tell, a
key member of the Comité de la Démocratie Sociale—he was a little
older, and perhaps the generational diﬀerence was as important as
any.44 Like other reform advocates, Bérenger had reﬂected not merely
on the actual reforms that were needed but on the methods of repub-
lican rejuvenation. He insisted that the strength of the reform move-
ment lay in its pragmatic approach to change. In a 1907 lecture Béren-
ger argued that there could be no speciﬁc recipe for social reform, but
that gradualism was absolutely essential: ‘‘The libre penseur (freethinker)
does not bring the complete solution to the social problem; he works
little by little, with the majority of the country, to bring the masses,
uneducated and unaware, to an understanding of social problems and
from there to increasing the happiness of each individual.’’45 Reform
demanded laborious attention and study, but the results of such work
would be more fruitful than those produced in the airy castles of doc-
trinaire Socialists or reactionaries. Bérenger, then, saw both social and
state reforms as rooted in a realist political practice—that is, as rejecting
the methods if not the ideals of the constitution makers in 1789.
It is important to keep an open mind as to the political impact of
diﬀerent elements of the reform movement. Through his newspaper
L’action, Bérenger pressed the government on the necessity of repub-
lican rejuvenation. Yet he bridged the gap between intellectual and
political debates in another, fundamental way. Bérenger’s Radical cre-
dentials were as solid as any: between 1901 and 1906 he had established
himself as one of the most virulent anticlericals in the French press.
The death of his brother, ﬁghting for France overseas, inspired Béren-
ger to conceive a passionate belief in the ideal of the uniﬁed, national
republic.46 National fulﬁllment would come through the triumph of the
freethinking republic over the church and the Right. There can have
been few more virulent scourges of the church than Bérenger: the lec-
tures and articles he produced throughout the separation crisis chan-
neled a torrent of criticism of Christianity in general and Catholicism in
particular.47 Like Paul-Boncour, Bérenger had been a ‘‘leader of youth’’
throughout the Dreyfus aﬀair and afterward. His newspaper, L’action,
was founded speciﬁcally to promote uncompromising anticlericalism.48
44 Bérenger was president of the Association Général des Etudiants de Paris when Paul-
Boncour joined it in the 1890s; Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres, 1:60.
45 Speech to the Université Populaire de Lille, delivered Dec. 1, 1907. Henry Bérenger, Pages
et discours de libre pensée, dix ans de bataille (1898–1908) (Paris, 1908), 413.
46 Henry Bérenger, La conscience nationale (Paris, 1898), 321.
47 Henry Bérenger, Christianisme et libre-pensée (Paris, 1903).
48 See C. Bellanger et al., Histoire générale de la presse française, vol. 3 (1871–1940) (Paris,
1972), 366.
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Yet as the separation crisis died down, Bérenger was one of the ﬁrst
Radicals or Radical Socialists to point out that libre pensée was in danger
of collapsing in on itself, still ﬁghting battles already won. As early as
1901 he had embraced the call for electoral reform on the basis of pro-
portional representation.49 In 1906 he demanded that the Radicals turn
from the religious to the social question.50 The battle was now between
proletariat and plutocracy, he argued. The 1906–10 legislature had to
inaugurate the social republic by introducing working-class pensions,
an income tax, and the development of a more organized network of
unions. By 1909 Bérenger had associated himself clearly with Briand’s
agenda.51 Thus the notion that the reform movement, as led by Briand,
was merely an attempt to move the governmental center of gravity to
the right, toward the Catholic-friendly progressistes, is undermined by
the evidence of Bérenger. Moreover, he saw the two streams of reform,
state reform and social reform, as complementary. Great emphasis thus
needs to be placed on the articles Bérenger wrote during Briand’s ﬁrst
government, as they allow us to sharpen our focus on the intellectual
movement and witness, close up, the application of this intellectual
movement in the arena of political debate. Bérenger is a crucial ﬁgure
for treating Briand’s concept of apaisement seriously.
Thus, by the autumn of 1909, when Briand was encouraging the
debate on state reform, a large and diverse constituency of reform-
minded intellectuals had emerged. It might be questioned how much
bearing this movement had on politics. Nevertheless, through the com-
plex web of their personal connections, we can see Bérenger and Anto-
nelli, for example, exercising an important inﬂuence on political de-
bate. Unlike some intellectual movements of the period (one thinks
perhaps of Action française or the supporters of the anarchist Gustave
Hervé), thesemen had a personal impact on the heart of the republican
debate. Reformism, an intellectual movement, drew its support from
the Left Bank academic and artistic world, but its chief proponents
were close to the leading politicians of the day and helped form opin-
ion through their journalism. Many of them played a role in the higher
administration, as did Paul-Boncour, chef de cabinet (head of administra-
tion) in the newly founded Ministry of Labor in 1906. Above all, they
had developed a formula that laid out the connection between diﬀer-
ent reforms, such as regional decentralization, electoral reform, or the
49 Bérenger, Pages et discours de libre pensée, 291.
50 Ibid., 345: article titled ‘‘Après les dieux, les maîtres.’’
51 He was greatly impressed by Briand’s speeches at Neubourg and Périgueux. See L’action,
Mar. 31 and Nov. 11, 1909.
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building of new contractual relationships in the workplace, and under-
scored all this with a call for the rejuvenation of the republic. As we
shall see after analyzing the debates of 1910 more closely, the main issue
facing this reformmovement was that of reconciliation. It was not social
so much as religious reconciliation that caused problems.
In any consideration of Briand, the question of religious reconciliation
naturally takes center stage. Briand ﬁrst came to the attention of the
public at large as the man charged with applying the separation laws,
which he did with a deliberate policy of conciliation. Conciliation would
remain his watchword in 1909. The development of his new agenda,
centered on the term apaisement, has commonly been analyzed in three
important speeches he gave in Neubourg in March 1909, in Périgueux
in October 1909, and in Saint-Chamond in April 1910. In the work of
his principal biographer, Georges Suarez, Briand emerges as a supple
politician testing the water of state reform through certain popular
ideas.52 What we do not see, however, is the intellectual cohesion that
underpinned these ideas. That is why we have dwelled so long on the
reform constituency prior to 1909, leaving our central character in the
wings until the serious and cohesive nature of these ideas has been
established.
A century after his appearance on the French political scene, Bri-
and remains a poorly known ﬁgure.53 If any part of his career has been
studied in detail, it is his activity on behalf of the League of Nations
from 1919 to 1932. The advocate of the general strike of 1900, the
voice of moderation in the separation crisis of 1905, the orator who
seduced the Chamber on so many occasions in the prewar years are
written about in passing. Suarez was himself discredited by his activity
during the Second World War, and Briand’s reputation suﬀered as a
result.54 Even at the time of his death in 1932, however, Briand had
receded from the center stage of politics. His eﬀorts for international
cooperation in the 1920s had seemed to lead nowhere. A signiﬁcant
leap of the imagination is needed to overcome these later impressions
and revive the sense of optimism that Briand inspired in 1909–10. The
writer Vercors recounts a conversation between his parents and a Hun-
garian diplomat in 1909: ‘‘My parents were sorry that Europe had, for
52 Georges Suarez, Briand: Sa vie, son oeuvre, avec son journal et de nombreux documents inédits,
6 vols. (Paris, 1938–52).
53 Madeleine Rebérioux, La république radicale? (1898–1914) (Paris, 1975), 13.
54 Jacques Bariéty, ‘‘Aristide Briand: Les raisons d’un oubli,’’ in Le plan Briand d’union fédérale
européenne, ed. Antoine Fleury (Bern, 1998), 4.
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the resolution of its conﬂicts, such mediocre governors. At this, in his
deep voice, the King’s councillor protested: ‘You, you have Brriand!
[sic].’ ’’55
To the Socialist Party, Briand was already a turncoat, and his
actions in 1910 would only exacerbate this sense of betrayal. He had
entered the world of political journalism writing for La lanterne in the
1890s, and he was elected from Saint-Etienne, the industrial mining
area, in 1902. Yet his acceptance of a ministerial portfolio under Cle-
menceau suggested, as he had done in his work on the separation laws,
that here was a bourgeois lawyer, much beloved of the ladies of the
theater, who had other agendas than the class struggle. Nevertheless,
the wave of enthusiasm that greeted Briand’s declarations at Neubourg,
and particularly the ﬁrst government statement of July 1909, has often
been dismissed. ‘‘As soon as we talked of appeasement and détente,
people put their faith in us,’’ Briand declared at Saint-Chamond. ‘‘Why?
Because this is a time when the country feels a great, an irresistible,
longing for union, concord, and fraternity.’’56 He was not making this
up: letters that survive from this period indicate that republicans of all
colors saw promise in his program.57 In the country at large he inspired
hope and conﬁdence.
To follow the themes of the reform constituency through Briand’s
ﬁrst government, we must consider both the intellectual movement
outside the chamber and the political debate animated by Briand him-
self. Only by doing so can we understand fully the central problem
facing Briand: how to turn a corpus of reform ideas that had acquired
great cohesion in intellectual circles into a reform program that would
hold together in Parliament. The RPéistes and regionalists, the social
reformers, and Bérenger himself all greeted Briand’s moment of hope
with excitement and some trepidation, as they witnessed their ideas
being taken up in the wider press and in Parliament.Thus the individu-
als we have examined in the ﬁrst half of this article reemerge as players
on the fringe of the political debate that concerns us from here on. An
important subtheme is Briand’s enigmatic position between intellectu-
als and politicians. In trying to understand this position, we are in fact
addressing one of the quintessential problems of Third Republic poli-
tics: the relationship between Parliament and the politically educated
class outside Parliament.
In March 1909, at Neubourg, Briand astonished the political world
55 Vercors, Moi, Aristide Briand: Essai d’autoportrait (Brussels, 1993), 10.
56 Suarez, Briand, 2:240.
57 The correspondence between Briand and Reinach is particularly telling. See Briand
papers, vol. 27, and below.
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by talking of participation and social democracy as a means to recon-
ciliation. It was Benoist and the Right who ﬁrst accused him of political
skullduggery, a charge that would be so often repeated by politicians—
and later, historians—of the Left.58 The social Catholic politicianAlbert
de Mun peevishly noted that the new government was taking up many
of his ideas. But the Radicals who had become utterly disenchanted
with Combes, as they had grown anxious about Clemenceau as the
nation’s ‘‘top cop,’’ were elated. Independent socialists such as Mille-
rand were not diﬃcult to bring on board. The up-and-coming Radical
Edouard Herriot saw the program as substantive and serious.59
At Périgueux Briand developed his themes, particularly that of
workers participating in the fruits of their labor. He envisaged a much
greater organization of labor, where unions would become ‘‘marchés de
travail’’ (work exchanges). It was Briand’s remarks on the ‘‘mares stag-
nantes,’’ however, that made this speech memorable. The little ponds
were the arrondissements with their cossetted deputies and their petty
inﬁghting; the wind that blew over them was that of state reform. To
suggest, as did David E. Sumler, that this was no more than the win-
dow dressing for a cynical attempt to build a coalition that would keep
the Radical Socialist Joseph Caillaux out of oﬃce, building bridges to
the right under the cloak of apaisement, is to attribute to Briand a level
of subtlety that even he did not fully merit.60 This speech was a sin-
cere attempt to describe to the electorate the hope that Briand had for
the future. Gabriel Hanotaux’s Carnets substantiates this less skeptical
interpretation: ‘‘He seriously wanted, I think, to bring together all the
republican party; he had no illusions about the force that moderates
would bring him. But I think that he wanted above all to obtain their
support for social laws that the Radical Party, meager and fractious,
would refuse him.’’61 The complication arose because Briand developed
policies on the basis of their necessity and the beneﬁts they seemed
to oﬀer the French nation as a whole. This realism was in fact at the
heart of the program of state reform, and it explains why Briand was
greeted with such enthusiasm: the Radicals’ time in oﬃce had been
disappointing because Combes and Clemenceau had clung doggedly
to the abstract principles of revolutionary republicanism, avoiding the
real problems of society.
58 Charles Benoist, Souvenirs, vol. 3, 1902–33 (Paris, 1934), 158.
59 Marie-Georges Dèzes, ‘‘Participation et démocratie sociale: L’expérience Briand de
1909,’’ Le mouvement social, no. 87 (1974): 114, 117.
60 David E. Sumler, ‘‘Domestic Inﬂuences on the Nationalist Revival in France, 1909–1914,’’
French Historical Studies 6 (1970): 517–37.
61 Gabriel Hanotaux, Carnets (1907–1925), ed. G. Dethan (Paris, 1982), 42.
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As the 1906–10 legislature drew to a close, many young reform-
ers expressed their disappointment in its achievements. Clemenceau’s
confrontation with the winegrowers of the Languedoc had turned him
away from the regional reform projects he had earlier condoned.62 One
major reform, the creation of France’s ﬁrst workers’ pension scheme,
had passed through theChamber, only to be left languishing in the Sen-
ate until the very last moment.63 Moreover, the bureaus of the Chamber
were ﬁlling up with such projects as the decentralization commission
chaired by Charles Beauquier. This commission, set up by Clemen-
ceau, had produced a project to which some Radicals seemed favor-
able.64 Nothing had come of it, however, and it remained to be seen
what Briandwould dowith administrative reform and the other reforms
that were increasingly pressing for attention, such as a new statute on
the position and authority of trade unions. In particular, Briand had
equivocated on the issue of the ‘‘mares stagnantes,’’ adjourning fur-
ther debate on electoral reform until the question was better under-
stood. This led both Benoist and later historians to see Briand’s politi-
cal maneuvering during this period as evidence that he was not fully
committed to ‘‘RP,’’ and that it was for him no more than a slogan.65
Briand did believe in the need for gradual reform, however. It was in
keeping with his conception of the main problem of politics: that last-
ing reform could never come from projects imposed rapidly, a priori,
on the nation. His correspondence reveals not only that he took more
than just a passing interest in electoral reform but that he had occa-
sional contacts with Benoist himself, which the latter’s memoirs do not
recall.66
The intellectual thrust behind the debate that Briand animated
was provided by Bérenger, who in his review of the Périgueux speech
advocated all of Briand’s measures, notably the idea of the trade union
62 See Clemenceau’s article in Paul-Boncour and Maurras, Débat nouveau.
63 In La lanterne, Mar. 5, 1910, Paul-Boncour described this as an unexpected development
that gave the legislature a better end-of-term report than it merited.
64 Cruppi, in Le matin, Dec. 20, 1909. Cruppi had moved from progressivism in 1898 to
membership in the Radical Socialist group in 1910—an evolution that provides a clue to his inter-
est in reforms about which the Jacobins of his party were more nervous. J. Joly, ed., Dictionnaire des
parlementaires français (Paris, 1960), 1192.
65 Benoist would, in his memoirs, accuse Briand of not being a true supporter of electoral
reform. Like the adept parliamentarian he was, he had simply moistened his ﬁnger to ﬁnd ‘‘the
direction from which the wind was blowing on the stagnant ponds’’ (Benoist, Souvenirs, 3:158).
Benoist’s memoirs, however, are notorious for the bitterness with which the failed reformer, who
had by the time of writing become sympathetic to the extreme Right, sneered at the core of the
republican party. Briand was, moreover, an easy target in 1934, and not only because he was no
longer alive to answer the criticisms: the rise of Hitler had shown his international policy to have
been overly optimistic, and this colored the judgment of writers, such as Benoist, whose memories
of the prewar period had become clouded with disappointment.
66 See Briand papers, vol. 25.
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as a ‘‘work exchange’’ in which capital and labor could cooperate.
Bérenger turned his criticism on the Radical Party, which, he said,
‘‘must rejuvenate, renew itself; it must stop feeding on narrow formulas,
worrying itself about tendencies and subtendencies, which perhaps had
their purpose yesterday but today no longer correspond to the reality
of things.’’67 The Radical Party was meeting at Nantes that very week,
and Bérenger connected Briand’s speech with a published letter pro-
gram addressed to the Radicals by Léon Bourgeois.68 The battle line in
political circles was now clear. On one side were Camille Pelletan, Emile
Combes, and many Radicals for whom the business of the government
consisted largely in the strengthening of republican mores through the
defense of the education system. On the other were some Radicals,
such as Ferdinand Buisson and Léon Bourgeois, with a number of inde-
pendent socialists led by Briand himself. In his New Year’s Day article
of 1910, Bérenger described the two poles of the republican Left in
terms of the governments of the previous year—a year of two halves:
‘‘The ﬁrst half was ﬁlled by the last phase of the Clemenceau ministry,
that is, by the burying of ﬁscal reform, by the strike of communications
workers, by mass sackings of civil servants, by multiple vexations against
the whole world of labor, and ﬁnally by the fall of the dictator. . . .
The second was marked by the inauguration of a new politics of social
appeasement and republican détente that spontaneously reestablished
discipline in the administration and freedom in the country.’’69
Between these two poles, Clemenceau’s republican defense and
Briand’s republican appeasement, many politicians could vacillate.This
was partly because Briand himself was not a doctrinaire advocate of
any speciﬁc measure—he was too cautious. Not all who might have
been expected to side with him did so. One might have thought that
Paul-Boncour would align himself directly with the government, but
he did not. His own principal sponsor, Maurice Berteaux, was one
of the government’s harshest critics during the debate of June 1910.
Paul-Boncour remained connected to his old friends from La démocratie
sociale, but he would eventually attempt to found his own grouping, situ-
ated more clearly on the socialist left.70 Briand had to strike the right
balance: the rhetoric of republican rejuvenation had to be enunciated
with great delicacy.
Thus Bérenger’s propaganda campaign was crucial. It attempted
67 L’action, Nov. 11, 1909.
68 L’action, Nov. 12, 1909.
69 L’action, Jan. 1, 1910.
70 AN 424 AP (papiers Paul-Boncour), vol. 8, has many reports on the ‘‘Parti républicain
socialiste,’’ which held its ﬁrst congress in Feb. 1914.
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to provide the intellectual coherence for a republican, anticlerical ma-
jority that would follow Briand. For many republicans, however, the
ultimate question in politics was the extremely mundane issue of where
in the Chamber one would draw the line between reaction and revolu-
tion, between right and left—and howmuch of the gray area in between
would have to be covered by a government program for a workable
majority to be built in support of it. There could thus be a dangerous
dislocation between rhetoric designed to shore up the government’s
support in the intellectual reform constituency—that is, outside the
Chamber—and the rhetoric as heard by Radicals inside the Chamber.
When Briand called for electoral reform, was he trying to build a new
forward-thinking party of the Left out of the stagnating Radical and
independent socialist groups, or did he seek a broader coalition that
included conniving clericalists? Read outside Parliament, the speeches
were interpreted in the former, positive manner; inside, they were seen
as a nefarious attempt to woo conservatives. Playing to the gallery of
wider opinion, Briand appeared sincere, but he neglected the pettifog-
ging Radical deputies at his peril.
When Briand delivered his next major speech, at Saint-Chamond
during the election campaign of April 1910, some commentators were
more skeptical about the government’s ability to bring about change.
Many, however, remained enthusiastic. Perhaps this was because of the
magnetic aura that Briand projected not only in his speeches but also
in the glowing reports published by most of the republican press. In
any case, the pressure for reform and the proposals the government
put forward in its declaration of June 1910 can be fully understood
only if we accept that there was a strong body of intellectual opinion
behind them.
How broad Briand’s coalition had to be hinged on how well the
Radical Party did in the 1910 elections. If it won a great preponderance
of seats, the government would be able to bring many undecided Radi-
cals behind its new agenda. If it did less well, the need to broaden the
basis of the government’s majority might lead, if not to the courting
of the Right by Briand, then at least to a sense among some Radicals
that he was building an unholy alliance of Socialists and progressistes.
Those accusations were indeed made; but the election campaign itself
was fought with the Radical Party following a line sympathetic to that
laid out by Briand at Saint-Chamond.71 This was in part thanks to the
eﬀorts of Léon Bourgeois and Ferdinand Buisson at the Radical Party
71 Bérenger described the Radical manifesto as a natural complement to the Saint-
Chamond speech: L’action, Apr. 13, 1910.
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congress, the former seeing in Briand’s overtures the natural extension
of his own philosophy of ‘‘solidarité.’’72
Meanwhile, Bérenger kept up the press campaign for appease-
ment. According to him, Briand’s government should institute both
electoral and administrative reform simultaneously.They were the pre-
requisites for any republican rejuvenation, since as long as the Chamber
was in thrall to arrondissement election committees, no generous over-
haul of the system could be expected. During the latter stages of the
1910 election campaign, and in the period after the elections while the
government was drawing up its new program, Bérenger wrote a stream
of articles on the issues of electoral reform and administrative reform
in particular. Social reforms such as the introduction of an income tax
and the development of the legal status of unions were, he argued, con-
tingent on state reform.73 It was clear that even the initial reforms were
far from simple, however. At the Radical congress, Bérenger had spo-
ken in favor of an electoral regime based on the scrutin de liste régional
(regional party list), and he admitted that it would be illogical to make
such changes without establishing the regions. These had a shadowy
economic and industrial existence already, he argued, but this needed
to be consolidated.74 For Bérenger, regionalism was a long-ripening
fruit now necessary for the growth of the republic.75
The intellectual campaign impinged on politics through the mani-
festoes of the candidates: the regionalists constantly cited the 412 depu-
ties who had put administrative reform on their manifestos.The region-
alist leader Charles-Brun’s scrapbook of articles covering the spring
1910 debate shows just how caught up the press was with the issue.
Regional reform was eclipsed only by electoral reform as a topic of
debate.76 Within the Radical mainstream, for every Camille Pelletan
who opposed regional reform, there was a Charles Beauquier who dem-
onstrated that the regional reform they conceived was eminently ‘‘Radi-
cal’’: it adapted the one and indivisible republic to its modern economic
concerns.
As the project’s complexity became more widely understood, how-
ever, the regionalists, realizing that it probably would not be presented
to Parliament, reverted to their more cautious position.They wanted to
72 See Jack Hayward, ‘‘Solidarity: The Social History of an Idea in Nineteenth-Century
France,’’ International Review of Social History 4 (1959): 261–84.
73 L’action, May 10, 1910.
74 Articles by Bérenger in L’action, May 13–16, 1910.
75 L’action, May 14, 1910.
76 Scrapbook in the Archives Charles-Brun, Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires, Paris,
box 18.
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avoid a repeat of the top-down administrative reforms of the Constitu-
ent Assembly and to follow the ‘‘realist’’ way of reform, that is, reform
slowly, with both ears tuned to the voice of public opinion, and thus
make the reforms organic rather than abstract. ‘‘We can’t do it on the
hoof, in a ﬁt of typical French enthusiasm,’’ wrote one of Bérenger’s col-
laborators at L’action; ‘‘we have to elaborate it with care and over time.
The eﬀorts of a whole legislature [four years] would not be too long.’’77
Moreover, a consensus seemed to be developing among all but the fully
paid-up members of the FRF that electoral reform ought to be intro-
duced before administrative reform, not least because the Chamber as
a whole had more expertise on that question and would more easily for-
mulate a coherent response. There was talk of a regional decentraliza-
tion, using thirty-six regions: but the government made no speciﬁc dec-
laration to this eﬀect, and the regionalists themselves were wary about
seeing such a reform introduced without a lengthy period of consulta-
tion and study.78
The question of electoral reform, however, deﬁnitely attracted the
new Chamber’s attention. By the end of May, Bérenger had thrown
down his own gauntlet: electoral reform would be brought before the
Chamber at once, whisked through a commission, and voted by the end
of the year; the Senate should ﬁnish its overlong deliberation on the
income tax; and a measure granting greater statutory rights to fonction-
naires should be passed as well.79 Hehad clearly been in close touch with
the inner circle of the cabinet, since he correctly foretold that the gov-
ernment’s electoral reform project would include a six-year mandate
for deputies and the renewal of the Chamber by thirds.
The government program was brought to the Chamber by Briand
on June 9. Bérenger grew exasperated as the debate was clogged up by
interminable interpellations, many of which seemed to have little bear-
ing on the details of the program. The main groups in the Chamber
used the debate on the government’s declaration as an excuse to estab-
lish their own identities, and their own position within Parliament.The
socialistes uniﬁés, for example, presented new young deputies as their
champions, including Albert Thomas, later known for his labor orga-
nizing during the First World War. The Socialists’ speeches were often
general statements of Marxist dogma, advanced without any real atten-
tion to the precise issues raised by Briand. More generally, deputies
on the center-left sounded the clarion calls of the republic: laïcité (the
77 Aulard, in L’action, May 26, 1910.
78 See Charles-Brun, in Le mémorial artésien, May 26, 1910.
79 L’action, May 27, 1910.
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doctrine of the secular state), republican defense, and the defense of
universal suﬀrage were constantly trumpeted from the tribune. Oratory
seemed to be at a greater premium than constructive reform.
We must examine this debate in some detail to correct the false
impression that Briand’s programwas a dangerouslymoderate platform
that sought to undermine the republican advance of the previous ten
years. It has been suggested that only the Right gave unequivocal sup-
port to Briand’s declaration and that the debate was thus a struggle
between republican vacillation and republican defense.80 Others have
tied this analysis to the developing crisis of national security and the
rise of nationalism, suggesting that Briand was but a staging post on the
way to the conservative Raymond Poincaré and his ‘‘nationalist’’ victory
in the presidential elections of 1913.81 Briand and Poincaré may have
shared an interest in state reform, but the argument for such a pro-
gram could draw its strength as well from syndicalist or independent
socialist sources as it could from the Right. The obsession with placing
projects and politicians on a sliding scale from left to right has clouded
the real nature of the political debate at this crucial period of the Third
Republic.
We should reiterate the distinction between the political rheto-
ric Briand used in the Chamber to establish his majority and the lan-
guage he used before the country as a whole at Neubourg, Périgueux,
or Saint-Chamond. Remarks to this wider audience did not need to be
as precise: they were designed to develop a public debate, not merely to
devise a parliamentary agenda. A declaration in the Chamber entailed
more speciﬁc rhetorical gestures, since, from the socialistes uniﬁés to the
nationalists, a great variety of political languages were spoken, each
with its own key reference points. So it was relatively easy for Briand
to speak to the country as a whole at Saint-Chamond about his plan
for republican rejuvenation based on state reform leading to social re-
form. In Parliament, however, each element of the programwould elicit
praise or derision from diﬀerent sections of the hemicycle. Regional
reform, for example, had become a commonsense measure for many
republicans, but in Parliament such commonplaces became bones of
contention. A regionalist proposal advanced by a man of the Left could
be cynically approved by the Right if the latter suspected that other ele-
ments of the Left would react against it and provoke the collapse of the
government. If such a measure were couched in terms of the defense
of the lay republic and subordinated to further measures protecting
80 Maurice Bourjol, Les institutions régionales de 1789 à nos jours (Paris, 1969), 151n2.
81 Most notably Sumler, ‘‘Domestic Inﬂuences.’’
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schools from a Catholic resurgence, the Jacobins in the Radical Party
might in turn have come to support it (as of course Bérenger had done).
In his June 9 speech to theChamber, Briand erred by using rhetori-
cal devices appropriate to the wider debate in a context that called for a
subtler approach. After all, the ﬁrst necessity was political: the govern-
ment needed to establish its majority, particularly after elections whose
results were at best confusing, for all that they reconﬁrmed the repub-
lican victory. A more straightforward program of republican defense,
which would unite the Radicals and Radical Socialists, would not have
responded to the great pressure in the country for republican rejuvena-
tion. Thus Briand adopted a rather dangerous tactic. He advanced his
program using the rhetoric of rejuvenation rather than that of republi-
can defense.This at once raised the hackles of many Radicals, who were
angered by the applause generated on center-right benches.
Briand did call for a republican majority, however.82 Notwithstand-
ing the outrage expressed by some Radicals and socialistes uniﬁés, he
clearly stated that his government would seek to preserve the achieve-
ments of the republic, notably its ‘‘conquêtes laïques’’ (secular victo-
ries), and he insisted that the lay education systemwas nothing less than
the cornerstone of the republic. It was the earlier part of his speech that
caused themost problems.He had begun by reﬂecting that the forces of
reaction had been neutralized and that republicans had to respond to
the call for reform.The question hinged on whether they would accept
that the old battle against clericalism was indeed won. Turning ﬁrst to
the Far Left, Briand called for a halt to the practice of one-upmanship,
which so often plagued the closing weeks of a legislature. The country
demanded social reform and would no longer tolerate tactics that pre-
vented it. He demanded a more responsible attitude to the process of
legislation. This angered the Far Left, but the Radical Socialists were
now on their guard as well. The next stage of Briand’s presentation left
them cold. Total silence fell on their benches as Briand insisted that a
government’s ﬁrst duty was to establish liberty and justice for all citi-
zens, regardless of the political passions of the hour.This was read, cor-
rectly, as a call for ‘‘appeasement’’—which the Radicals understood as
religious appeasement, not merely appeasement of the social unrest
that had spread under Clemenceau.
As Briand outlined his plan for electoral reform, he touched on the
defense of universal suﬀrage, a rallying cry for all Radicals. But many
had notheard the rumors about thesix-yearmandate proposal:‘‘mouve-
82 Speech reported in Le matin, among other newspapers, June 10, 1910.The citations from
the declaration and the reactions of other deputies that follow are from this source.
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ments divers’’ were noted throughout the Chamber. When Briand
turned to administrative reform, making it the corollary of electoral
reform, thesemovements developed. Given the background to this dec-
laration, it may be surprising that many deputies continued to associate
regional decentralization with reaction. Nevertheless they did, and in
spite of the most ‘‘modern’’ spin Briand could muster (‘‘It is possible to
superimpose a regional organization over departmental organization,
by grouping departments on the basis of aﬃnity of interests, notably
in the economic domain’’), the oﬃcial reports recorded one legisla-
tor’s remark, ‘‘My word, he is becoming royaliste!,’’ as a testimony to the
reaction of many in the Chamber. Briand’s elucidation of the need to
improve the administration, develop the country’s infrastructure, and
introduce a legal statute for civil servants again met with silence among
theRadical Socialists. A lengthy exposition of his ideas for social reform
revived some of their interest. He called for the extension of greater
rights to unions, the establishment of workers’ credit, the setting up of a
systemwhereby workers could beneﬁtmore from the proﬁts of industry,
and, in rural areas, the introduction of a right to property for peasants.
He spoke of economic emancipation as naturally following the political
freedom the republic had achieved at its outset.
The reaction to Briand’s speech showed that he had taken a dan-
gerous tack. As a speech to be read in the newspapers, by the public
at large, his presentation could not have been faulted. He had brought
peace after the battles of the past and established a range of new proj-
ects for the social republic of the future. In the Chamber, however,
reaction varied widely. Pelletan, perhaps predictably, proclaimed, ‘‘Not
for years has any government given such a boost to the Right!’’ Jau-
rès understood it a little better, but even he foresaw danger for Briand.
‘‘Never,’’ he insisted, ‘‘for all that I am a proportionnaliste, would I have
dared criticize the regime and its habits in this way.’’ The newspapers
cited many Radicals and Radical Socialists who approved of the decla-
ration. Le radical hinted that the problems were issues of minor detail,
not of doctrine: Briand was overly keen onmilitary expenditure; he had
not suﬃciently developed the defense of the secular education system;
and he had not addressed the question of state monopolies.83
The Radical Socialist deputy Louis Malvy expressed the problem
with the declaration most clearly.84 It was a question not of what had
gone into the speech but of the tone Briand had adopted and the order
83 Le radical, June 10, 1910.
84 Ibid. Malvy, a minister during the First World War, was implicated in the scandal involv-
ing Caillaux’s private attempts to bring about peace.
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in which he had made his points. Malvy had wanted to see income tax
reform and the defense of secular education at the top of the agenda.
By beginning with state reform, moving on to social reform, and only
touching on issues of republican defense, Briand had given the Cham-
ber the impression that he was courting the Center and the Right.Thus
the tidal wave of interpellations that prolonged the debate until the end
of June had a purpose beyond the oratorical vanity of parliamentarians.
It was important to the Radicals that Briand’s rhetorical emphasis be
altered, and thus they constantly sought ‘‘clariﬁcation’’ by asking where
on the axis of political allegiance the government proposed to ﬁnd its
center of gravity.
If the split between Jacobins such as Pelletan and state reform-
ers such as Briand was the most obvious, another division was even
more important in the long run.The problem of the income tax lurked
behind the scenes in Radical Socialist quarters.The brilliant but ﬂawed
Caillaux, who had become an alternative ﬁgurehead for Radical Social-
ism, had made the campaign for a modern income tax his own, and
there was already a frisson of tension between Christ and Napoléon,
as Clemenceau had described Briand and Caillaux.85 Indeed, it can be
argued that Briand had ignored the income tax merely to snub Cail-
laux.86 When the Briand experiment ended in early 1911, it was Cail-
laux who emerged as the alternative leader of the Left (although the
willfulness of his foreign negotiations eventually compromised him).
This helps explain the muted reaction from the political group
closest in theory to Briand, the independent socialists, and behind
them intellectuals such as Parsons and Antonelli. As they met to dis-
cuss their own response to the declaration, they expressed consider-
able reservation about the whole program. Paul-Boncour argued that
the government could have built a far stronger majority on the left if it
had elaborated more on social-economic reforms.87 State monopolies
should have been developed; they were a feature of the Radical Party
program and could have provided a new point of union between Radi-
cals and Socialists. This gives a clear hint that some of the reform con-
stituency believed it unnecessary to seek a wider coalition, and that the
forward-looking reform agenda would best be served by concentrating
more heavily on social reform. Paul-Boncour never worked for Briand,
85 Quoted in Rudolph Binion, Defeated Leaders: The Political Fate of Caillaux, Jouvenel, and Tar-
dieu (New York, 1960), 29.
86 Ibid., 31.
87 Le radical, June 17, 1910.
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but the following spring he entered the cabinet of Ernest Monis, which
was largely animated by Caillaux.
Le radical ’s editorial the day after the debate had begun answered
some of the criticisms. The editorialist seemed to understand that Bri-
and was using the Chamber to address the country as a whole.88 This
of course was both the strength and the weakness of the declaration.
But this important organ of the center-left press believed that Briand’s
remark about the secular education system proved his trustworthiness.
He had oﬀered measures that were not just republican but social demo-
cratic, and thus in tune with the needs of the nation.89 La lanterne reiter-
ated this interpretation, insisting that Briand was not talking to the
Right but rather was inviting the Left to work with him and move on
from past battles.90
Eventually, Briand gave the Chamber the assurances it had de-
manded. The government wanted to follow a program that would rise
above party politics, he said, but it would resign if its majority ever
depended on the Right. The speech with which Briand closed the de-
bate won over many republican groups in the Chamber, the press, and
the country as a whole—not to mention foreign newspapers that, par-
ticularly on the other side of the Channel, had good reason to observe
the progress of reform in France.91 The general impression was that
Briand could count on a majority made up of Radicals and Radical
Socialists, without having to rely on the Center-Right. He appealed
once more to the Chamber’s sense of national duty, promising that the
government would govern with a republican majority, but for the coun-
try as a whole.92
Many of Briand’s doubters had in fact been members of the re-
form constituency who were suspicious of his beautiful speeches, which
seemed to capture so easily the mood of the hour; but it was not Briand
who had frustrated their call for ‘‘action, not words’’ so much as the
endless interpellations from deputies seeking, in lengthy ﬂights of ora-
tory, clariﬁcation on subtle points of interpretation.93 At the beginning
of July, in the last days before the summer recess, the government tried
to galvanize the enthusiasm of the reform constituency once more, with
88 Le radical, June 11, 1910.
89 Paul Bourély, in Le radical, June 11, 1910.
90 La lanterne, editorial, June 11, 1910.
91 See the citations in Suarez, Briand, 2:269.
92 See, e.g., reports in L’action, July 28, 1910.
93 Henry Bérenger complained forcefully of the lengthiness of the debate in L’action, July 20,
1910.
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the deposition of three major laws: the project on electoral reform, as
promised in the declaration; the long-awaited civil servants bill; and a
reform of the judiciary that was announced by Briand’s justice minis-
ter, the moderate Louis Barthou.94 Administrative reform would have
to wait until the autumn. A circular to prefects asking for their views on
regional reform was sent out in September; what came of it amid the
chaos that followed in October is impossible to trace in detail.95 It is
by no means clear that any concrete proposal on administrative reform
would have passed in the Chamber, even if the three major reforms put
forth in July had been accomplished.
The mood in July 1910 was, however, tremendously favorable to
Briand. He was applauded across Europe as a true statesman. Enco-
miums came from unlikely quarters. Joseph Reinach thought Briand’s
summing-up speech the best thing he had heard since Gambetta. He
pointed out to Briand that much of the old opportunist approach was
germane to Briand’s own desire to institute slow, peaceful change.96 The
connection between a politician now on the center-right, Reinach, and
a socially reformist government illustrates how broadly the concern for
republican rejuvenation resonated with politicians of all parties, and
it demonstrates once more the inadequacy of the bipolar model as a
deﬁning concept in the politics of the Third Republic.
The most important of the compliments paid to Briand was, how-
ever, a letter from Millerand, holidaying in Carlsbad at the end of July.
Millerand, himself a strong personality, had infuriated his fellow Social-
ists by entering the government of Waldeck-Rousseau. As Socialist turn-
coats, he and Briand, who had been colleagues at La lanterne in the
mid-1890s, shared a common position in politics: despite the strength
of their personalities, they lacked a real power base in the Chamber.
In view of later developments, the following letter from Millerand to
Briand is striking:
My dear friend,
It is now a year since you formed the ministry, and I did not
want to let this anniversary pass without sending you, from abroad,
my aﬀectionate remembrances and my friendly gratitude for having
associated me with the major project you have established and pur-
sued with so much talent, courage, and success.
Diﬃculties you have not lacked, and they will continue. But
94 See L’action, July 1, 1910.
95 See Bourjol, Institutions régionales, 152.
96 Briand papers, vol. 27: several letters from Reinach, undated but clearly from the period
Oct. 1909–Oct. 1910, oﬀer encouragement and praise for recent speeches. The connection was
further developed by Georges Béret in De Gambetta à Briand.
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your very persistence in the post is a precious boost to your attempts
to overcome them. Even here I have heard fellow countrymen who
are far from sharing our ideas enthusiastically praising you, and
you can imagine with what pleasure and pride I have received their
plaudits.
You have renewed the politics of our country, which the regime
badly needed.Your task is only just beginning as you attempt to real-
ize all the hopes to which that renewal has given rise; you have only,
if you will allow me to reiterate what I have sometimes told you in
person, to have conﬁdence in yourself.Your strength is greater than
you imagine: take heart from that.
For myself, I am proud to have been able, thanks to you, to col-
laborate in such a noble and necessary enterprise.97
The events of the autumn of 1910 have obscured the fundamental sym-
pathy between Millerand and Briand, founded on the hope that the
latter had instilled in the country. The notion that Briand’s own per-
sonality was holding him back seems strange, but perhaps he did have
less conﬁdence in himself than his presentation at the tribune of the
Chamber suggested. When we consider that never again, in any of his
numerous governments, did Briand announce such a broad package of
domestic reforms, with such a powerful political statement of the art of
governing and the duty of a legislature and a cabinet to the country at
large, we see that theremay indeed be something vital to be drawn from
Millerand’s letter. Briand’s own character is an important consideration
as we turn to the end of his appeasement experiment.
The failure of Briand’s program stems largely from the events of Octo-
ber 1910, when a railway strike broke out and Briand was forced to
adopt strong tactics to restore order. Unlike the debate from the May
elections to the summer recess, these events have been well covered by
biographers and historians and must be passed over more rapidly here.
We need to begin, however, by revisiting the political debate within the
Radical Party, which had not been fully paciﬁed by the end of June 1910
and which provided a context for the autumn crisis.
During the parliamentary recess, Bérenger renewed the propa-
ganda campaign for Briand’s program in a long series of articles in
which he attacked the Jacobin wing of the Radical Party.98 Although
most Radicals in the Chamber had been won over, Emile Combes, the
former prime minister who was now using his position in the Senate to
criticize government vacillation over the issue of republican defense,
97 Briand papers, vol. 26, dated July 25, 1910.
98 Articles in L’action, Aug. 6–25, 1910.
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had not been party to those discussions. He rightly saw that Briand’s
reform movement was grounded in a rejection of the narrowly anti-
clerical policy he had himself pursued when head of the government
between 1902 and 1905. He issued a denunciation of Briand, timed just
after Parliament had been dismissed for the summer. Bérenger took up
the argument for the reformers. Combes, he insisted, had never even
had a program of social reform and was therefore in no position to
accuse Briand of using his as a shield for right-wingers. There was a
problem, Bérenger was forced to admit:apaisement, the term that Briand
had used from early 1909 to distinguish his social and state reforms,
was still causing confusion. Combes could use it to suggest that Briand
was more concerned with appeasing the clerical Right, yet that had
never been Briand’s understanding, nor was it supported by Bérenger,
La démocratie sociale, or the Radicals and Socialists closest to Briand.99
Bérenger admitted that the government had been applauded by some
on the right, but he blamed Radicals such as Combes. If they had come
on board unequivocally, the problem would never have arisen and the
government could have established its program more eﬃciently.100
As it was, the summer recess was looking increasingly dangerous
for the government and its plans. The railway workers had been threat-
ening to strike since the spring, and although Millerand had steered
other workers away from suchmeasures, he could not prevent the chemi-
nots from walking oﬀ the job at the end of September. The outbreak
came hard on the heels of the death of Briand’s mother, for whom the
prime minister was still in mourning. Although he gave no sign of it in
political debate, Briand was shattered, and his concentration on politi-
cal issues must have suﬀered. He decided to break the strike by con-
scripting the railway workers into the army, thus obliging them to keep
working. Although a wide body of opinion praised him for his coura-
geous action, his own cabinet was split.The two most senior left-wingers
in the government were René Viviani, who had strong links to working-
class movements, having been the ﬁrst minister of labor under Clemen-
ceau, and Millerand. The latter was extremely anxious about the con-
sequences of Briand’s action, while the former was simply furious.101
The Chamber reconvened in an atmosphere of great tension, with
the government already on shaky ground. As he sought to reassert his
authority, Briand gave a remarkable speech in which he declared ille-
99 L’action, Aug. 13, 1910.
100 L’action, Aug. 12, 1910.
101 Suarez, Briand, 2:278–79; on Barthou’s reaction, see R. J.Young, Power and Pleasure: Louis
Barthou and the Third French Republic (Montreal, 1991), 94.
BRIAND’S MOMENT OF HOPE 63
gality an option, albeit a last resort, for a government determined to
protect the national interest.This statement divided opinion evenmore
sharply. The slippage between the speech’s reception in the Cham-
ber and in the newspapers the next morning was even greater than
before.102 As he had done in June, Briand seduced the intellectuals and
the reporters, but in the end it was the ﬁre and brimstone called down
by Socialist and Radical Socialist deputies that doomed the govern-
ment. Without the support of Viviani and Millerand, the whole point
of Briand’s apaisement was lost; it had always depended on a coalition of
moderates and independent socialists, with backing from the intellec-
tual Radical Socialists we have examined here.The atmosphere of hope
and trust that Briand had instilled in the Chamber, and that had been
strong enough to survive the debate of June 1910, had been shattered
by the end of October.
Briand’s personal reaction to this turn of events is diﬃcult to
fathom. His remark about illegality was politically reckless: no amount
of spin in center-left newspapers would help him strengthen his ma-
jority for the reform agenda.Why, having seenViviani’s earlier reaction
to his strikebreaking tactics, did Briand not attempt to beguile the Left
and calm the atmosphere in the Chamber? He evidently did not think
the reaction of the Far Left worth the trouble. One of Briand’s biog-
raphers pointed to a classic incident: a hard-line Socialist was heap-
ing invective on him, and Briand could be seen uncharacteristically
making copious notes—it was widely assumed that he was outlining
the brilliant retort he duly delivered. In fact, Briand was writing to his
lover Berthe Cerny, begging forgiveness for his distraction in the cur-
rent political climate.103 His blithe attitude, admirable to some, was ulti-
mately a weakness. If he had genuinely believed in the great program
he announced in June, his approach to building the political consen-
sus necessary to see it through was lackadaisical. When he resigned to
form a new cabinet, Briand seemed to have forgotten the whole apaise-
ment campaign. His second cabinet was dominated by men for whom
republican defense was the ﬁrst imperative: compared to the agenda of
June 1910, the new government’s program was very narrow. The prin-
ciple of arbitration in labor disputes remained central (of necessity),
but Briand’s campaign for wide-reaching state reforms was over.
The two themes of the reform constituency were once more di-
102 See letters from Henry Bernstein, Oct. 21, 1910 (Briand papers, vol. 21), and Ferdi-
nand, King of Bulgaria, who visited the Chamber during this debate, Nov. 1, 1910 (Briand papers,
vol. 25). On Bernstein and Briand, see Suarez, Briand, 2:280–81.
103 Saint-Georges de Bouhélier, Un grand amour de Briand (Geneva, 1949), 308.
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vided. The hope for state reform now lay with the moderate Poincaré,
who would emerge as a leading force in 1912; at the same time, social
reform was pushed forward by Caillaux. This new political arrange-
ment allowed the mass of republicans to make a clearer choice. Poin-
caré drew support from some on the left, such as Briand himself, while
others found the clearly Radical Socialist agenda of Caillaux much
more uncompromising than that of Briand. The new alignment in fact
predates the argument over the three-year military conscription law,
which many have seen as the principal dividing line in the prewar
Chamber.The political disputes of 1913–14 were prepared by the fallout
from Briand’s apaisement experiment.
That the reform constituency had divided into two camps, one
maintaining pressure for electoral or administrative reform, the other
focusing on social issues, was made clear by the problems experienced
by the groups of young intellectuals that had coalesced around Briand
in 1909–10. The Comité de la Démocratie Sociale was confronted with
a grave choice: either refuse any cooperation with social Catholicism,
or continue on the path of appeasement by building bridges across the
old divide between clerical Right and anticlerical Left.104 The Catho-
lic republican movement muddied the waters. Marc Sangnier, founder
of the social Catholic organization Le Sillon, had thrown down the
gauntlet to left-wing intellectuals, demanding the foundation of a new
party that would unite all who sought the rejuvenation of the republic.
Because of the interventions of Radicals such as Combes and Pelletan,
this challenge was issued too late. Antonelli and Parsons were uncertain
how to proceed and found the decision taken out of their hands by the
intransigent anticlericalism of the ‘‘Jeunes radicaux,’’ led by Paul Hya-
cinthe Loyson.105 The young reformers convened a congress with the
aim of harmonizing their antistatist programs. Regional decentraliza-
tion was a central part of the agenda, with La démocratie sociale, Le Sillon,
and a group known as the ‘‘Jeunesse républicaine patriote’’ all subscrib-
ing to the basic principles of regionalism. Yet even here it was obvious
that union in the republican youth movements was impossible.106 The
reform constituency was impossibly divided.
Older Radicals, notably Combes and Clemenceau, continued to
prevent progress, hampering Poincaré’s state reform projects in the
Senate. Thus France’s reform constituency was divided at its base and
104 Gérard Baal, ‘‘Les jeunes radicaux (1910–1914),’’ in Hommage à Madeleine Rebérioux:
Avenirs et avant-gardes en France, XIXe–XXe siècle, ed. V. Duclert (Paris, 1999), 332.
105 Baal, ‘‘Jeunes radicaux,’’ 334.
106 The Congrès Républicain de la Jeunesse of June 6–7, 1911, was reported in the Revue
politique et parlementaire of Aug. 1911.
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frustrated at its apex. Intellectuals would continue to criticize the unre-
formed state, as Robert de Jouvenel’s La république des camarades showed.
The FRF and other pressure groups continued their propaganda, and
much cross-fertilization went on between the diﬀerent movements for
state reform. For example, Antonelli, who was Charles-Brun’s princi-
pal interlocutor at a special session of the eminent Société d’Economie
Sociale, asked the regionalist leader whether he could see regional-
ism as part of a wider program of social and state reforms.107 In the
longer term, state reform remained essential to many who wanted to
rejuvenate the republic, whether they were building programs of post-
war reconstruction or attempting to revive republican institutions in the
crisis of the mid-1930s. But the Jacobins of the Radical Party stymied
progress at the one time, in 1910, when pressures were less and when
success might have been possible.
Although some social reformers had implicitly rejected Briand
as a progenitor of reform, many aspects of his style remained. Paul-
Boncour, for example, declared that he had but one aim as minister
of labor: to apply the pensions law by July 3, 1911.108 The concern with
making politics more practical was essential. As with Briand’s attack
on the ‘‘mares stagnantes,’’ what was at issue was the nature of Par-
liament. Rejuvenation of the republic would only come if politicians
concentrated on thorny issues of economic and social reality. This con-
centration on a ‘‘politique réaliste,’’ and the establishment of a social
reform agenda within republicanism, had emerged in Briand’s moment
of hope and would be perhaps its most important legacy.
Thus the strange moment of hope that presented itself to France
in 1910 is central to the history of the Third Republic. In the current
atmosphere of French historical and political studies, realism and the
reaction against a priori principles are all too easily associated with the
‘‘New Right.’’ This is because Maurras and others sometimes used terms
such as realism and organicism to underscore their own political projects.
Discovering such terms in the manifestos of independent socialists can
thus be surprising. The issue of Briand’s personality is important as
well. Put oﬀ perhaps by the epithets applied to Briand later in life—
Briand the lazy man, too idle to develop a sustained program that fol-
lowed socialist principles—scholars of early-twentieth-century politics
have all too often ignored the presence behind Briand of a coherent
body of intellectual opinion. Marie-Georges Dèzes put her ﬁnger pre-
cisely on the nature of this opinion in her contribution to a special
107 The meeting was held on Jan. 8, 1912, and reported in the Réforme sociale of Mar. 1912.
108 Henri de Jouvenel, preface to Le Blond, Idées de Paul-Boncour, 9.
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issue of the journal Mouvement social on reformism. Briand’s project was
placed ‘‘under the patronage of those who . . . refused the millenni-
alist irrationalism of ideology, and described a government of opin-
ion as that which reestablished social balance through a progressive
program of daily action.’’109 Above all, then the ‘‘politique réaliste’’ of
Briand implied reforming slowly, day by day, in consultation with public
opinion. Intellectual groups such as Benoist’s proportional representa-
tion activists or Charles-Brun’s regionalist movement thus had a double
role to play. By building grassroots support through propaganda, they
would create the conditions for reform to be politically realizable; by
continuing to promote state reform in more intellectual circles, they
persuaded opinion makers that state reform was a tangible problem,
involving real social issues. The haste demanded by Bérenger in the
summer of 1910 was not the best way to proceed: a longer campaign
was needed, involving the education of public opinion as well as the
adoption of reform packages.
In the short term, this meant that reform was often frustrated.
The essential point, however, is that writers such as Antonelli and Paul-
Boncour struggled to make politics dependent on normative political
problems rather than on a priori questions. Perhaps they were ahead
of their time. Briand embodied the philosophy of steady change to the
extent that, when compared with the vocal dogmatists of the Radical
and Socialist parties, he appeared to be a vacillator, an ‘‘endormeur.’’
Yet the ‘‘normatization’’ of politics had a clear intellectual coherence,
and the ongoing struggles of politicians such as Briand, Viviani, and
Poincaré to respond to the proposals thrown up by the intellectual
reform constituency show that the Third Republic was not a dead-end
régime but one where arguments over principle were slowly and uncer-
tainly giving way to arguments over ‘‘progrès quotidien,’’ the politics of
daily reform.
At the heart of political debate was an increasing focus on real-
ism and pragmatism. From the crisis of the 1930s until the later years
of the twentieth century, pragmatism was a dirty word, associated with
collaboration and an erosion of those principles on which liberation
depended. Yet when a Lionel Jospin proposes, within the constitution,
a special status for Corsica, or a Jean-Pierre Raﬀarin institutes the
idea of ‘‘experimental lawmaking,’’ allowing state reform to be intro-
duced at speeds that vary according to the needs of diﬀerent regions,
it is clear that realism is once more deﬁning French political debate,
cutting across the old party lines and perhaps fulﬁlling some of the
109 Dèzes, ‘‘Participation et démocratie sociale,’’ 117.
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hopes raised by the state reformers and social reformers of the belle
époque.Understanding the reform debate of 1900–1910 is clearly rele-
vant to current ideas about decentralization and constitutional change.
Briand’s moment of hope may in the short run have been a false dawn,
but in looking at the intellectual and political context of that moment,
we have seen that the realist approach to politics was central to main-
stream republican thinking. That is why the more pragmatic but less
doctrinaire programs of reform continue to bring a note of optimism
into French politics.Whether Raﬀarin’s realism can successfully answer
the great questions that arose out of the presidential elections of April
2002 remains to be seen, especially after the Right’s humiliation in the
regional elections of April 2004. Nevertheless, this article has suggested
that the historical references for such an understanding are fruitful and
abundant.
